On Values and Science:  
_The Korean Decision_ Reconsidered  

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All political scientists recognize the importance of values in science, but rarely do we have so clear an example of it in a single case. The _Korean Decision_, originally written from a violence-accepting standpoint, is reviewed here from a nonviolent value position. It is argued that such a value shift calls for sharper analytical focus upon violence, for further decontamination of proviolent language, for more vigorous exploration of nonviolent alternatives, and for the creation of comparative actor-observer value profiles to assist awareness and control of biases in research. It is hoped that this reanalysis will assist the transition of political science as a violence-accepting and violence-legitimating social science discipline toward greater emphasis upon the creation and application of nonviolent knowledge.

Science itself is not a liberator. It creates means, not goals. . . . We should remember that the fate of mankind hinges entirely upon man's moral development. (Einstein)\(^1\)

In _The Korean Decision_\(^2\) I tried to make a contribution to the scientific study of international politics by exploring in a first case study the decision-making approach to analysis that has been suggested by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin.\(^3\) Since the period of research and writing that resulted in publication of _The Korean Decision_ I have changed my personal value position toward violence from acceptance to rejection. The purpose of this essay, therefore, is to explain the principal differences this makes in the original Korean decision analysis.

This should interest both social scientists and critics of social science. We all profess awareness of the importance of values in social science research, but we rarely have so clear an example of it in a single case.

**Original Violence-Accepting Approach**

The intent of the original study was to describe the series of decisions that led to American engagement in the Korean War; to reconstruct them from the point of view of the decision makers; to analyze them in terms of the interaction of organizational, informational, and motivational variables; to evaluate them; and to seek guidance for coping with future war-prone crisis situations. Thus I devoted two background chapters to explaining pre-decisional domestic and international conditions, seven narrative chapters to describing daily decision-making events from June 24 to June 30, 1950, an empirical analysis chapter to suggest correlations among the decision-making variables, a normative analysis chapter to evaluate the decisions, and a final chapter to suggest guidelines for "crisis management" in Korea-like situations.

Underlying all—reconstruction, analysis, evaluation, and prescription—was my normative acceptance of the employment of violence in politics, both domestic and international. Although generally to be avoided, occasions could arise in which political violence would be inescapable, just, and even heroic. My views on violence coincided exactly with those of the American decision makers whom I studied and were reinforced by my adolescent political socialization during World War II and by a personal sense of just participation in resisting blatant Communist aggression as an antiaircraft artillery communications officer in Korea from 1950 to 1952. Such views on the conditional acceptability of violence were merely the dominant mode of thinking of the mid-twentieth century in which we lived. Almost all political leaders, revolutionaries, counterrevolutionaries, political scientists, and other citizens held essentially the same views. The main political arguments of the age were not about violence per se but rather about the ends of violence and, with the advent of nuclear weapons, increasingly about its scale.

The method of decision-making analysis that I employed did not explicitly require acceptance of a violent or nonviolent value position. Rather it took the form of a value-neutral set of analytical tools. Implicitly, however, in this case it encouraged the acceptance

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of proviolent value assumptions (a) by stressing that decisions ought to be understood primarily as seen through the eyes of the decision makers, and (b) by not containing methods for explicating researcher values, for comparing them with those of actors, for measuring their effects upon analysis, and for evaluating decisional outcomes. Although actor values were given explicit attention, observer values were not. They were left to vary with the professional conscience of the researcher.

Because I believed that social scientists should make explicit their value preferences as indicators of possible factual and interpretive biases in their scientific works, I recorded my personal judgment of the Korean decision: “The writer regretfully cannot accept the pacifist view that the North Korean attack should not have been resisted by the armed forces of the Republic of Korea and such international allies as they could muster.” ⁴ Although not made completely clear in the original text, this judgment rested upon two beliefs: (a) that violent extension of their domains by unjust regimes justified counterviolence, and (b) that the state of civil liberties in South Korea was better than that in the opposing North. I wrote in 1968, “Less than twenty years after the event, the Republic of Korea seems to be traversing a far more open and spontaneous path of development than that of its Northern counterpart. . . . Without the Korean decision, this would not have been possible.” ⁵ In short, American violence had contributed to peace and freedom in Korea. Therefore the decision to fight was good.

Nonviolent Value Change

It is not essential to accept or understand the reasons why I changed to a nonviolent value position in order to appreciate the effects of this change upon re-analysis of The Korean Decision, but since colleagues and students have expressed keen interest in them an explanation is necessary.

At the conscious level, I am aware of the converging effects of three principal factors: public commitment to a proviolent value position, realization that Korean conditions were developing contrary to the values taken to justify violence, and discovery that we Americans who were self-righteously committed to threats of violence in Korea were ourselves obstacles to the creation of nonviolent alternatives in international relations.

By 1973 the repressive nature of the Republic of Korea political regime had become globally notorious, mainly through the activities of the Korean CIA at home and abroad. This included the drugging and kidnapping from Japan of opposition presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung, the persecution of the poet Kim Chi Ha and Catholic Bishop Daniel Chi, and the stifling of other voices of legitimate dissent in the press, universities, and the religious community. This has been accompanied by the progressive elaboration of violence-based laws and decrees that make the pacific transfer of power increasingly unlikely.

Growing awareness of increasing repressiveness in Seoul was combined with what was the startling discovery that the main obstacle to the establishment of peaceful cultural relations between Americans and scholars from North Korea was the United States government. Meeting in Paris with scholars from the North Korean Academy of Sciences in the summer of 1973, I invited them on behalf of the University of Hawaii to visit Honolulu. They were eager to come. How shocking it was for me to discover that the American ambassador in Seoul, the Washington Korean desk officer, and the Secretary of State were adamantly opposed to such a visit and refused to give assurances that entry visas would be issued. Although the Department of State was receptive to visits to North Korea by certain Americans such as Professor Jerome Cohen of Harvard Law School and Selig Harrison of the Washington Post, it was adamantly opposed to reciprocal American hospitality. This meant no aloha for North Koreans.

Against this background, it was especially disturbing for me, during a visit to the Hiroshima atomic bomb Peace Park in August 1975, to hear on a portable radio a statement by the U.S. Secretary of Defense that the government would not give assurances that nuclear weapons would not be employed in an American response to a renewed outbreak of fighting on the Korean peninsula.

In effect the United States government was threatening nuclear war in defense of a repressive regime, while obstructing the development of peaceful relations between American citizens and those of a potential military adversary. These were definitely not the conditions of freedom and peace to which the wartime killing of 1950 to 1953 had been devoted.

For me, this represented an intolerable situation of cognitive dissonance. Violent means had proved inimicable to peaceful ends. I

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⁴Page, p. 352.
⁵Ibid., p. 354.
could attempt to change reality by further commitment to the value of violence; I could elect nonviolence and then seek reality change; or I could deny the conflict and withdraw. In actuality I experienced a profound change in attitude toward violence from acceptance to rejection.

Furthermore, I experienced this change in a general sense, not just in Korea-specific terms. Perhaps this was because I had always approached the study of Korean history and contemporary society as a social scientist seeking to understand the general from the particular. Partly because of the uniquely intense concentration of American, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian influences upon the Korean people over the past century I have always thought that this convergent experience offered extraordinary possibilities for global insight. Korea thus became for me a broken link in the chain of violence forged by human history, a chain in which the glorification of each preceding link becomes the justification for its successor. But let us examine the implications of such a value change for the scientific single case analysis attempted in The Korean Decision.

Implications for Background Reconstruction

Review of the two background chapters from a nonviolent value perspective creates awareness that the reconstruction of pre-decisional “givens” contained therein is biased in at least two ways: proviolent propensities are inadequately stressed, and nonviolent potentials are almost completely ignored.

To illustrate the first point, the chapters make no mention of the American decisions to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (August 6 and 9, 1945) as part of the historical experience that may have preconditioned American decision makers in 1950 toward engaging in violence in Korea. This is especially important for understanding the aggressive aspects of Harry S. Truman’s personality and of the presidential role. The Korean Decision cites President Truman’s letter to his sister of August 12, 1945, to illustrate that “he was learning to live with difficult decisions.” “Nearly every crisis seems to be the worst one,” wrote Truman, “but after it’s over, it isn’t so bad . . .”6 However the narrative is silent upon the fact that this declaration of growing ability to make difficult decisions without tormenting afterthoughts came less than a week after decisions that had wiped out two urban communities with a horrendous immediate loss of 140,000 lives in Hiroshima and 70,000 in Nagasaki.7 Japanese violence had legitimated American counterviolence, therefore our consciences were clear.

In accepting counterviolence as justifiable, The Korean Decision also underplays the contribution that victims of violence may have made to its initiation. Thus we are told of Truman’s disgust with Russia’s commitment to power politics (e.g., “Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making. Only one language do they understand—how many divisions have you?”—letter to Secretary of State Byrnes of January 5, 1946),8 but we are not told of Russian perceptions of American power behavior in this era of American atomic monopoly. Applied to Korea, the background analysis does not ask if American politics from 1945 to 1950 might have contributed to a North Korean decision that only violence could assure the attainment of Communist political objectives there.

On the other hand, the background chapters are silent on the leaders, ideas, and experiences, both domestic and international, that tried to contribute to a nonviolent world in the 1945 to 1950 period. This is an artifact of proviolent values plus method: seeking to explain justifiable American counterviolence to North Korean aggression we tend not to seek evidence that nonviolent alternatives might have been even remotely possible. This means writing violent history that suppresses awareness of human potentials for nonviolent futures. Not all Koreans, for example, both leaders and other citizens, considered it inevitable or necessary that Kim II Sung send armies south or that Syngman Rhee invade the north in order to reassemble the tragically divided nation. Who were they? What ideas did they have? How were they suppressed? What can we learn from them for a nonviolent Korean future? Furthermore, what

6 Ibid., p. 24.
7 These figures are taken from the report of an expert commission created by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1976. The losses are estimated as of December 1945, with a margin of error of ±10,000 persons in each case. The Hiroshima figure includes an estimated 20,000 military deaths. By 1950, total deaths attributable to direct bomb exposure are estimated as “more than 200,000” in Hiroshima and “more than 100,000” in Nagasaki. Takeshi Araki, mayor of the City of Hiroshima, and Yoshitake Moretani, mayor of the City of Nagasaki, Appeal to the Secretary General of the United Nations, n.p., October 1976, p. 31.
8 Paige, p. 54.
American domestic or international resources for nonviolent politics existed in the pre-1950 period? The Korean Decision is written as if the American Friends Service Committee and Mohandas K. Gandhi, among others, had never existed.9

In short, a nonviolent perspective in decisional background analysis should lead to enhanced awareness of both proviolent and nonviolent potentials in the decision makers and their environments.

Implications for Narrative Reconstruction

The principal methodological feature of the narrative chapters of The Korean Decision, aside from the effort to operationalize the variables of the decision-making approach, was the effort to “decontaminate” the description from the normative biases of the author. The intent was to treat normative issues independently of factual description. The narrative might be filled with normative judgments of the decision makers, but those of the reconstructing social scientist ought to be suppressed in that context. Review of these chapters from a nonviolent perspective, however, reveals several outcroppings of proviolent biases and the consequent need for further “decontamination.”

For example, describing the Korean military situation just prior to the June 26 American decision to commit air and sea forces to combat, I wrote:

At this time the Korean Government was withdrawing from Seoul to Suwon, 20 miles to the south across the Han River, as the invaders continued their unrelenting advance. The armored column spearheading their drive in the Uijongbu corridor was voraciously chewing its way through the two full South Korean divisions which hopefully had gone forth to bring it to a halt. Along the invasion route to Seoul the blood of heroes and cowards together with the blood of those bewildered ones to whom circumstance did not provide a conscious choice between courage or cowardice stained the damp Korean earth the same bright red [emphasis added].10

From a nonviolent position the author’s gratuitous judgment of Koreans who killed as “courageous” and those who sought to escape killing as “cowards” is readily apparent. From such a position the judgment, if any were to be made here, could be exactly the opposite. Readers of The Korean Decision can further decontaminate the narrative simply by striking out the italicized sentence.

The cited passage contains yet another example of proviolent bias in its reference to the North Korean armored forces as “voraciously chewing” their way through the southern defenders. This imagery, implying in horror film fashion a mechanical beast devouring human victims, sets the stage for human heroes to vanquish inhuman foes. The same mood is conveyed by an earlier reference to “northern legions” that “swarmed” over southern hills.11 Northern soldiers were neither the ghosts of long-dead Roman phalanxes nor insects; like their southern counterparts, they were mainly farm boys engaged in the task of killing. These passages thus can be decontaminated further by noting that the northern armored forces “murdered” their way through two defending divisions and that large numbers of North Korean soldiers advanced across the southern hills.

In the final paragraph of the narrative section, concluding the chapter on Friday, June 30, the proviolent bias of the author is made unmistakably clear. Referring to the efforts that would have been required to carry out the air, sea, and ground combat decisions that had been taken, the passage begins with the statement: “It would be no picnic.”12 Then the bias emerges clearly in the form of a dramatic quotation in which an actor is found to express the method-suppressed view of the author: “As Republican Representative Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey, an ordained Baptist minister, expressed it: ‘We’ve got a rattlesnake by the tail and the sooner we pound its damn head in the better!’ ” Note again the employment of inhuman collective imagery—North Koreans are “a rattlesnake.” Note also the implied religious justification for killing.

The passage concludes with two sentences that complete the effect of bias. First, “Most Americans wholeheartedly agreed.” In support


11Ibid., p. 82.

12Ibid., p. 270.
of this contention I footnoted a Roper Poll of responses to the statement that "President Truman did the right thing in sending our troops into Korea" which showed 73 percent agreement, 15 percent disagreement, and 12 percent with no opinion. This poll, of course, provides no evidence of the degree of commitment implied by the word "wholeheartedly." In view of the abrupt swing of public opinion against the war, contributing to Eisenhower's victory in the 1952 presidential election, the depth of support is questionable. For the purpose of further decontamination let us simply strike the word "wholeheartedly" from the text.

In the final sentence immediately after the assertion that "most Americans wholeheartedly agreed," I wrote: "Not the least of these were those who were committed and who slain on the distant peninsula jetting down between the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan." Although the dead are beyond polling, I would now hypothesize that a study of letters written by them to friends and relatives from the combat zone would reveal views more diverse than implied by my gratuitous invocation of their opinion. The value of nonviolence simply raises questions about exaggerated portrayals of human acceptance of violence. In sum, decontamination of the narrative would be better served if we struck out the whole last paragraph of chapter 10.

Implications for Empirical Re-Analysis

Reconsideration of the empirical proposition-building chapter of The Korean Decision from a nonviolent value position produces a disquieting sense that the original analysis is somehow truncated, stunted, and cut off from lucid engagement with the central problem of the Korean decision: why violence emerged and why it was responded to in kind. Instead the analysis is first diffusely devoted to the effects of "crisis" as an independent variable upon organizational, informational, and motivational aspects of decision-making processes.

The primary emphasis in the original analysis was to take "crisis" as an independent variable and to treat "organization," "information," "values," "internal setting," and "external setting" as dependent variables. 13 Secondarily, I combined all these variables in a set of propositional statements that described four decisional "stages" that characterized response to crisis in the Korean case. 14 Interestingly, the word "violence" did not appear in this analysis: words such as "positive response" and "costly commitment" were used instead.

Since a violent or nonviolent outcome was not the primary focus of attention, I finally concentrated overall explanatory analysis of the Korean decision upon its most outstanding processual characteristic: it was a "high consensus decision." Thus:

The stronger the organizational leadership, the less the variability in decisional unit membership, the more the shared learning of unit members with respect to the issue for decision, and the less tolerable the decision delays—the less the variability of information and values supplied from within the unit, the less the articulation of alternative courses of action, and the greater the probability of single courses of action that are anticipated to win leader approval. 15

Combining the initial interest in crisis effects upon decision-making variables with the secondary interest in a high consensus outcome, the overall logic of the original Korean decision analysis can be summarized as: crisis affects decision-making variables that produce high or low consensus outcomes.

If an explicit concern for violence is introduced into the analysis, however, we obtain the following pattern of analysis: crisis affects decision-making variables that produce violent or nonviolent outcomes. From a nonviolent perspective we are challenged to focus attention more sharply upon the substantive content of crisis decisions. The Korean case thus needs to be perceived not only as an example of a "high consensus decision," but also as a "violence-accepting decision."

A complex propositional statement to sum up the violence-accepting aspect of the Korean decision may now be added to the text 16 as follows:

The more the organizational influence of a violence-accepting leader, the more the decisional participation of members skilled in accepting of violence, the more the past satisfaction with participation in violence, the greater the availability of instruments of violence, the greater the confidence in overall weapons superiority, the less the anticipated counterviolence, the greater the social acceptance of violence, the less the salience of violence.

13 Ibid., pp. 281-318.
14 Ibid., pp. 318-21.
15 Ibid., p. 321; emphasis in original.
16 Insert after propositions (i.e., after line 22) in ibid., p. 321.
nonviolent alternatives, and the greater the belief that competing decision makers are motivated by a similar logic—the greater the probability of violent decisional responses to crises in international politics.

At the end of the original chapter devoted to empirical analysis of the Korean decision, I briefly introduced three propositions intended to "link properties of decisions with problems of their execution by large-scale governmental organizations." These predicted a gap between intent and performance if the decision content is ambiguous; a link between the seriousness of expected counteraction and the degree of decisional specificity; and a tendency to delegate command and control functions to field commanders where severe counteraction is not anticipated. Again, the word "violence" did not appear in any of the statements.

Approaching the same problem from a nonviolent perspective, it appears that decisions based upon the assumption of justified violence are apt to be ambiguous; that the acceptance of violence tends to preclude attention to complementary and possibly supplative nonviolent coping alternatives; and that violence-based decisions are likely to be permissive of initial commander autonomy in a violent direction.

While a proviolent value bias in empirical analysis seems not to have repressed evidence of nonviolent alternatives considered by the decision makers, since they all seemed satisfied with violence, this does not mean that it had no analytical effect. For example, no effort was made (a) to develop nonviolent alternatives with which the decisions could be compared, (b) to question the degree to which each decision maker was committed to violence, and (c) to probe through interviews the existence of latent nonviolent alternatives or to obtain a more detailed understanding of why such alternatives were considered infeasible.

Implications for Normative Re-Analysis

The Korean Decision contains a chapter devoted to normative evaluation of the decision. Four different approaches were taken. First, a normative inventory of the case materials reviewed the judgments of the decision makers, domestic critics, external allies, and external critics. Second, some common criteria of international political evaluation were explored. The Korean example was found to fall in the category of good decisions; i.e., decisions that pursued good ends by just means in a flexible, realistic way with beneficial long-range effects. Third, the conditional approbation of violence by major world religions was recalled and a pacifist perspective was entertained and dismissed. Finally I presented my own judgment.

It is the latter which I wish to revise here. I now believe that the American decision to fight in Korea is not a decision worthy of moral justification by a social scientist, any more than that which produced the North Korean attack, that the American decision vastly increased the loss of life in Korea including later many Chinese, that confirmation of the decision by congressional resolution which I originally recommended would not have made it more just even if politically more tenable, and that the long-range effects of the Korean decision have not been beneficial for Korea as a whole or for international political life. The Korean decision did not realistically make international political violence less likely, as illustrated by the case of Vietnam, to which official American satisfaction with the Korean decision undoubtedly contributed. The international militarization to which the Korean War contributed did not make world peace more secure; witness continuing arms races, increased anxiety over American military security, and nuclear weapons proliferation.

The United States' decision to engage in violence in Korea, not "resist aggression" as in the title of a 1958 article jointly written by Richard C. Snyder and myself,\(^{18}\) has contributed to the unprecedented militarization of both parts of Korea. In 1950, there were 286,091 men under arms in Korea (151,091, south; 135,000, north).\(^{19}\) out of a total population of about 29,715,000 (20,167,000, south; 9,548,000, north)—or one soldier for every 104 persons. By 1975 this had risen to 1,092,000 men under arms (625,000, south; 467,000,

\(^{17}\)Ibid., pp. 321–23.

\(^{18}\)The "resist aggression" characterization, rather than "to intervene," was strongly advocated by Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson and accepted by me in Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme," Administrative Science Quarterly, 3 (December 1958), 341–78. One problem with the "resist aggression" formula is that it implies total evil of the aggressor and that only military measures offer hope of successful resistance.

out of a total of 50,350,000—or one soldier for every 46 persons. This increase was combined with vastly more destructive weapons, and with the high likelihood that both contending Korean governments will achieve independent nuclear weapons capabilities in the near future.

The threat of violence in Korea, based upon the ultimate acceptance of the possibility of a violent “solution” by both sides and their international supporters, has legitimized the suppression of political freedom in both parts of Korea, a value that the original “realistic” commitment to violence was intended to protect and enhance.

Thus my own judgment is that the Korean decision does not merit praise as a contribution to world peace and freedom. It should rather be judged as a stimulus to search for nonviolent alternatives to resolve human conflicts and to realize human aspirations then, now, and in the future.

Reassessment of Action Implications

In the final chapter of The Korean Decision, I tried to derive some lessons from the Korean case to guide future American policy makers in crisis situations. All based upon acceptance of violence, these suggestions were: not to underestimate potential enemy military strength; to be receptive to friendly critics so that “force” might be employed less dangerously and with more political support; and to set clear limits on the employment of force so that it might be employed with surgical precision.

From a nonviolent perspective, the best “lesson” to be learned from the Korean decision is that American policy makers should be encouraged to experiment with the assumption that American violence will not be applied in international politics, that American military supplies will not be provided to support the violence of others, and that policy makers should work positively toward nonviolent resolution of the grave domestic and international conflicts that threaten human dignity, economic decency, physical survival, and world peace.

A multinational nonviolent approach to pre-1950 conditions in Korea and to coping with violence if it erupted there would by no means imply that only military measures would be appropriate or effective, either in the short or long run. An extraordinarily versatile combina-

dition of political, economic, social, cultural, and communications means might be employed to prevent, resist, limit, and defuse armed aggression including physical resistance to the point of death with intent not to kill but to touch the hearts of the aggressors. A nonviolent policy approach to the Korean decision and its preconditions does not therefore imply passive acceptance of violence but rather more creatively vigorous efforts to end and avoid lethal conflicts than a violence-accepting approach would require.

Analytically we need to add to the repertoire of skills in decision-making analysis the caution that the more the agreement of the scientist with the values of the decision makers, the more limited the likely development of evidence and analysis that would support alternative courses of action. A collegial check upon such biases would be constant encouragement of value diversity among scientists. An individual check would be to prepare comparative actor-analyst value profiles and to seek deliberately to extend the range of congruence-predicted analysis of alternatives.

In conclusion, The Korean Decision needs to be re-examined not as a text on how to handle violence better but rather as a challenge to how to avoid it in the first place. If violence does occur, then the best crisis advice is to limit it, compartmentalize it, diminish it, weaken it, calm it, cool it, find alternatives to it, seek rewards to end it— not to increase it, fuel it, supply it, justify it, praise it.

In an age of unprecedented potential for violence, the supreme task of political science becomes the creation and application of nonviolent knowledge. It will benefit us little if our continued “realistic” acceptance and justification of political violence prevents us from creating alternatives to it. The Korean Decision thus needs to be reanalyzed as a contribution to this task and not allowed to stand as a scientific apology for the future continuation and possibly irreversible escalation of violence in international political life.

The original dedication of The Korean Decision was “To all who died in the Korean War, and to all who make and study political decisions.” To this should now be added, “for a nonviolent future.”

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21 The remarkable experiment by Tsai, in which after 700 trials he got a cat and a rat to cooperate in obtaining food without a coercive security barrier between them, can serve as a stimulus to constructive thought along these lines. See Loh Seng Tsai, “Peace and Cooperation Among Natural Enemies: Educating a Rat-Killing Cat to Cooperate with a Hooded Rat,” Acta Psychologia Taiwanica, 3 (March 1963), 1–5.